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Abstract 
We study how banking competition may affect the stability of banking systems. We develop our study 
by expanding the failure-determinant methodology to include panel-data techniques and by controlling 
the effects of financial structure and development. We use indicators for 47 countries between 1990 
and 1997. The main findings show that banking concentration and foreign ownership are associated to 
bank-based financial systems and financial underdevelopment. They also show that banking credit and 
bank-based financial systems enhance banking fragility. Banking concentration is not a significant 
determinant. Furthermore our findings suggest that financial structure and, maybe, the property regime 
matter to assess fragility.  
 
Resumen 
Estudiamos cómo la competencia bancaria afecta la estabilidad de los sistemas bancarios. 
Desarrollamos nuestro estudio expandiendo la metodología de los determinantes de las crisis a fin de 
incluir técnicas de datos en panel y controlando los efectos de la estructura y el desarrollo financieros. 
Usamos indicadores para 47 países entre 1990 y 1997. Los más importantes hallazgos muestran que la 
concentración bancaria y los bancos de extranjeros  se vinculan a sistemas financieros subdesarrollados 
y en donde predominan los bancos Dichos hallazgos muestran también que el crédito bancario y los 
sistemas financieros en donde predominan los bancos promueven la fragilidad bancaria. La 
concentración bancaria no es un determinante significativo. Además, nuestros hallazgos sugieren que la 
estructura financiera y, quizás, el régimen de propiedad importan para evaluar dicha fragilidad.  
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BANKING COMPETITION AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY: EVIDENCE 
FROM PANEL-DATA 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of how competition affects the stability of banking systems is not well 
understood [Carletti (2007)]. Here we study how banking competition may affect the 
stability of banking systems by using the most extensive and consistent databases 
publicly available.
1
 We develop our study by expanding the failure-determinant 
methodology to include panel-data techniques and by controlling the effects that 
financial structure and development may have on the performance of banking 
systems. We use internationally comparable banking and financial data for 47 
countries between 1990 and 1997. 
 
Our study is motivated by academic and practical concerns. Specifically it is 
motivated by the necessity to understand the nature of this issue and its implications 
for the design of policies. Currently there is no consensus on the theoretical effects 
that competition may have on banking fragility. Furthermore, existing empirical 
studies on the issue usually provide contradictory results. Indeed in the literature 
exists three different views about the relationship between banking competition and 
financial fragility.
2
 Thus there is no reliable guide for policy makers regarding how to 
avoid banking crises in increasingly competitive banking and financial environments.  
 
Here we aim at clarifying how banking competition determinants may relate to 
financial fragility by suggesting answers to the following questions: What are the 
main empirical associations between banking competition and financial structure and 
between banking competition and financial development? How does banking fragility 
may affect the relationships between banking and finance? What are the specific and 
joint effects of banking competition determinants on banking fragility? Are these 
effects differentiated? Which type of implications may be derived from these 
findings?   
                                                           
1
 We use panel-data extracted from the cross-country database on financial development and structure 
[Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000)], and from the one on episodes of systemic and borderline 
banking crises [Caprio and Klingebiel (2002)]. The databases are available at the World Bank´s 
website: http://econ.worldbank.org [Titles: “A new database on financial development and structure” 
and “Episodes of systemic and borderline financial crises”]. 
2 See Allen and Gale (2004a) and Carletti (2007) for surveys. 
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We develop this study by following three steps. First we build several banking 
competition indicators based on measures of bank concentration, domestic origin, 
public ownership, activity and size of banks. Later we estimate several OLS 
regressions to analyse how the financial situation of banking systems (which may 
involve or not a crisis), may affect the associations of financial structure and financial 
development with banking competition. Finally we study the effects of banking 
determinants on banking fragility with fixed-effects logit models for panel data. We 
use individual and principal-components indicators for the empirical assessments. 
 
We consider that our study has some specific features that differentiate it with respect 
to other studies. A first feature is that we use internationally comparable banking 
indicators to develop the investigation.
 
A second one is that we use logit panel-data 
models to assess the determinants of banking fragility. Traditional studies use 
multivariate logit techniques.  A third one relates to the characterisation of the 
“stylised facts” between the banking and financial indicators. The last distinctive 
feature of our study is that we control the effects of financial structure and 
development when we assess the determinants of banking fragility. 
 
Our results have implications for theoretical and policy purposes. Specifically OLS 
regressions suggest that certain general associations exist between the banking and 
financial indicators. We denominate such empirical associations as the stylised facts 
between banking competition and financial systems. These stylised facts suggest that 
banking concentration, foreign ownership and the relative activity and size of banks 
with respect to those of bank-like institutions are associated to bank-based financial 
systems and financial underdevelopment. They also suggest that domestically and 
publicly owned banks may prevail in market-based and financially developed 
financial systems, at least, during banking crisis episodes.  
 
The models for panel-data show differentiated effects of the banking determinants on 
banking fragility. Particularly the econometric outcomes suggest that if credit activity 
relies on banks or if the financial system is bank-based, the likelihood of crises will 
increase. Another suggestion is that the banking determinants, the features of the 
financial system and the property regime of banks jointly matter to analyse the 
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likelihood of crises. Empirically the results support the view that the relationship 
between banking competition and financial fragility involves more than a trade-off. 
Moreover they support the idea that financial structure matters to assess fragility. 
 
Our investigation complements other papers that analyse the issue of the determinants 
of banking fragility. Theoretically our findings support recent studies that suggest that 
competition determinants may have differentiated effects on banking fragility [See 
Allen and Gale (2004a) and Boyd and De Nicolo (2005)]. Empirically our study 
complements the findings of other cross-country studies that have analysed the 
determinants of banking crises. Specifically our findings complement those that show 
that weak macroeconomic environments, cyclical movements, deposit-insurance 
schemes and weak law enforcement conditions may encourage banking fragility.
3
  
 
The paper is divided in eight sections. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 
describes the data. Section 4 discusses methodological issues about the OLS 
assessments. Section 5 extends such discussion to the failure-determinant 
methodology. Section 6 characterises the stylised facts associated with the banking 
and financial indicators. Section 7 shows the effects of banking competition 
determinants on financial fragility. Section 8 summarises and discusses the main 
findings. The appendix shows further econometric estimations to support the 
consistency of the fixed-effects logit panel-data models.  
 
 
2. Banking competition and financial fragility 
Academically it has been recognised that the relationship between banking 
competition and financial fragility is complex and multifaceted [Allen and Gale 
(2004a)]. In fact, there is not consensus about the nature of this relationship or about 
its implications for economic policy. The literature provides several arguments for 
and against promoting competition. This seems relatively strange because policy-
makers frequently deal with competition and stability issues at the same time.  Here 
we review the three main views in the literature and explain the theoretical 
foundations of our empirical study.  
                                                           
3 See Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) for a review of such studies. 
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The first view assumes that competition enhances fragility. Empirically, under the 
explanations of this view, fragility arises due to agency problems between banks, 
depositors and deposit insurance funds or because of non-concentrated banking 
systems [See Keeley (1990) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003)]. 
Theoretically this view is supported on analyses that focus on the risks associated to 
competition for deposits, banking deregulation and risk taking behaviour of banks 
[See Matutes and Vives (1996), Repullo (2004) and Dam and Zendejas-Castillo 
(2006)]. Traditionally this view has been the predominant one in the literature. 
 
The main implication of this view is that concentration or regulations may enhance 
banking stability. Such implication explains why the desirability for banking 
competition has been questioned since long. In addition, it justifies the need for 
regulation. However this implication is arguable. For example, some studies show that 
banking concentration is not negatively correlated to competition [Claessens and 
Laeven (2004)]. Furthermore, others point out that the issue of how competition 
affects the stability of banking systems and the effectiveness of regulation is not well 
understood [Carletti (2007)]. 
 
The second view argues that banking competition enhances financial stability. Like 
the previous view, it also has support on several studies. Empirically such view is 
supported by studies of the history of US banks and by studies that focus on 
international cross-sectional data [See Rolnick and Weber (1983) and Claessens and 
Klingebiel (2001), respectively]. Theoretically, this view is supported by analyses that 
argue that competition may enhance stability by reducing information asymmetries or 
by increasing liquidity provisions through inter bank markets [See, Caminal and 
Matutes (2002) and Bossone (2001), among others]. 
 
The main policy implication that arises from this view is that financial laissez-faire (or 
free banking), may be desirable. Particularly, Dowd (1996) summarises the three main 
arguments that support such belief: 1) if free trade is good, there must be a prima facie 
case in favour of free trade in banking; 2) if free banking seems strange at first sight, 
this is because we take certain things for granted (like government intervention in the 
financial sector); 3) empirical evidence is consistent with free banking theory. Such 
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arguments are supported by those who claim that banking failures are the indirect 
result of regulatory efforts [See Benston and Kaufman (1996)]. 
 
The third view suggests that the analysed relationship involves more than a simple 
trade-off.  Particularly, Allen and Gale (2004a) study the efficient levels of 
competition and stability with several models. They develop their study with general 
equilibrium models of intermediaries and markets, agency models, models of spatial 
and Schumpeterian competition and models of contagion. In some of their models, 
they find a trade-off but in others there is not. This view may explain the 
contradictory results found by researchers. Differentiated effects may appear as result 
of the assumptions, circumstances and data used to analyse competition.  
 
The third view also suggests that the effects of competition may depend on specific 
economic conditions. Specifically Boyd, De Nicolo and Smith (2004), show that a 
monopolistic banking system faces a higher failure probability than a competitive one, 
when the inflation rate is below certain threshold; otherwise, the opposite conclusion 
holds. Furthermore, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) show that the effects of banking 
competition depend on opposite risk incentive mechanisms. One is associated to the 
choice of riskier portfolios when competition increases. The other is associated to the 
increase of default risks when banking markets become more concentrated. 
 
The three views indicated above do not explicitly consider the financial environment 
where banking activities are carried out.
4
 However, the opportunities for financial 
agents to deal with financial risks and to engage on risk sharing activities depend on 
the particular properties of the financial systems [See Allen and Gale (2000) and 
(2004b)]. We can relate the study of the relationship between banking competition 
and financial fragility with the theory on comparative financial systems, because such 
properties depend on financial competition. Specifically, they depend on the 
competition among banks and markets, and among banks themselves.  
 
We believe that empirical studies on the relationship between banking competition 
and financial fragility should include financial system indicators. Methodologically 
                                                           
4 The exception is the paper of Boyd, De Nicolo and Smith (2004). 
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their inclusion will allow us to capture the features and properties of financial 
systems. Currently few studies relate financial and fragility indicators [See Ruiz-
Porras (2006) and Loayza and Ranciere (2006)]. However none of these studies is a 
banking failure-determinant study.
5
 We believe that such consideration justifies the 
inclusion of financial structure and development indicators as control variables in 
assessments regarding the relationship between competition and fragility. 
 
We conclude by indicating that we are far from a consensus regarding the effects of 
banking competition on financial fragility. The literature is rather limited and 
inconclusive [Carletti (2007)]. Existing studies show that these effects may not be 
univocal or straightforward. Thus, further studies are necessary for policy purposes. 
Particularly, we believe that empirical studies based on the theory of comparative 
financial systems may be useful to clarify the analysed relationship. In fact, such 
theory and the necessity to develop further research motivate and differentiate our 
study. Moreover they suggest some of its methodological guidelines.  
 
 
3. Banking and financial indicators 
Here we describe the financial and banking indicators used in our study. However, 
before proceeding, we assume certain definitions for operative purposes. Specifically 
we assume that the competitive features of the banking industry can be captured with 
market structure data of commercial banks and with data of bank-like institutions.
6
 
Financial development will mean the level of development of both intermediaries and 
markets. Financial structure will refer to the degree to which a financial system is 
based on intermediaries or markets.  Banking fragility will mean a situation in which 
systemic or non-systemic banking crises are present in an economy.  
 
We build the indicators by extracting data from two databases. Specifically we build 
the main indicators with panel-data extracted from the database of Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2000). Such data allows us to capture the main features of the 
                                                           
5 Ruiz-Porras (2006) studies the “stylised facts” that characterise stable and unstable financial systems. 
Loayza and Ranciere (2006) focus on the determinants of long-run economic growth.  
6
 Bank-like institutions include intermediaries that accept deposits without providing transferable 
deposit facilities and intermediaries that raise funds on the financial market mainly in the form of 
negotiable bonds. 
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financial system and the banking market structure of a country. Furthermore, we use 
the database of Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) to build the indicators of banking 
fragility. Such indicators include dummies for systemic and non-systemic crises and a 
general one for fragility. Methodologically the main advantage of using these 
databases is that provide us with consistent data across countries and across time.    
 
The features of the banking and financial data are summarised in the following table:   
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Table 1. Banking and Financial Data 
 
 
 
Definition 
 
 
Variable 
 
Time span 
 
Countries 
 
Observations 
 
Banking fragility variables 
Dummy variable on systemic 
episodes of banking fragility  
(banking crisis=1; otherwise  0) 
 
SYSTEM 
 
1975-1999 
 
93 
 
113 
 
 
Dummy variable on non-systemic 
episodes of banking fragility 
(banking crisis=; otherwise 0) 
 
BORDER 
 
1975-1999 
 
44 
 
50 
 
Banking market  structure variables 
Concentration  
(Ratio of the 3 largest banks to total 
banking assets) 
 
BCON 
 
1990-1997 
 
137 
 
822 
 
Foreign bank share (assets) 
 
FBSA 1990-1997 111 673 
Share of publicly owned 
commercial bank assets in total 
commercial bank assets  
 
PBSA 
 
1980-1997 
 
41 
 
213 
Bank-like institution variables 
 
Total assets of other bank-like 
institutions to GDP 
 
BLAY 
 
1980-1997 
 
54 
 
766 
 
Private credit by other bank-like 
institutions to GDP 
 
BLCY 
 
1980-1997 
 
43 
 
652 
Financial structure and development variables 
Overhead costs of the banking 
system relative to banking system 
assets 
 
BOHC 
 
1990-1997 
 
129 
 
719 
 
Private credit by  deposit money 
banks to GDP (Bank credit ratio) 
 
DBPCY 
 
1960-1997 
 
160 
 
3901 
Private credit by deposit money 
banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP  (Private credit 
ratio) 
 
 
TIPCY 
 
 
1960-1997 
 
 
161 
 
 
3923 
 
Stock market capitalisation to GDP 
(Market capitalisation ratio) 
 
SMCY 
 
1976-1997 
 
93 
 
1171 
 
Stock market total value traded to 
GDP (Total value traded ratio) 
 
SMVY 
 
1975-1997 
 
93 
 
1264 
Notes:  
- The database on banking crises includes the two qualitative variables included here. A banking crisis 
is defined as systemic if most or all banking system capital is eroded by loan losses (5% of assets in 
developing countries). A non systemic banking crisis includes borderline and smaller banking crises 
[See Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and (2002)]. 
- The complete financial development and structure database includes statistics on the size, activity and 
efficiency of various intermediaries (commercial banks, insurance companies, pension funds and non-
deposit money banks) and markets (primary equity and primary and secondary bond markets).  
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The sample was built according to data availability. It includes data for Argentina, 
Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, 
Germany, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Malaysia, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Spain, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkey, United States, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. Thus the sample includes data for 
47 countries over the period 1990-97. 
 
We define eleven individual indicators to describe the banking and financial 
environment of each country. We organise the indicators in three assortments. The 
assortment of banking indicators contains measures of concentration, origin and 
ownership of commercial banks. Furthermore it contains measures of the activity and 
size of banks relative to that of bank-like institutions. The assortment of structural 
indicators contains measures of the activity, size and efficiency of stock markets 
relative to that of banks. The assortment of development indicators contains measures 
of the activity, size and efficiency of stock markets and banks.  
 
The banking assortment is integrated by five indicators. The first three are the 
Banking-Concentration, the Banking-Domestic and the Banking-Public indicators. 
The first measures the ratio of three largest banks to total banking assets.
7
 The second 
and third ones measure the respective share of domestic and public ownership of 
commercial banks.   The last two indicators are the Banking-Activity and Banking-
Size ones. Large values of these indicators are associated to high levels of credit 
activity and to a large size of banks relative to those of bank-like institutions. We 
include these indicators as complementary measures to competition. 
 
We follow Levine (2002) to build the individual financial system indicators. Such 
indicators are organised in two assortments: The structural assortment is integrated by 
the Structure-Activity, Structure-Size and Structure-Efficiency indicators.
8
 In this 
                                                           
7 We are aware that this ratio is a very rough measure of banking concentration and an arguable 
measure of banking competition. However this is the only measure available to capture the structure of 
the banking industry.   
8
 Levine (2002) uses these three main indicators to assess the structure of financial systems. Structure-
Activity equals the logarithm of the total value traded ratio divided by the bank credit ratio. Structure-
 10 
assortment market-based financial systems are associated to large values of the 
indicators while bank-based ones are associated to small values. The financial 
development assortment is integrated by the Finance-Activity, Finance-Size and 
Finance-Efficiency indicators.
 9
 In this assortment financial development is associated 
to large values of the indicators, while underdevelopment is associated to small ones. 
 
Furthermore we build two aggregate indicators to summarise the information content 
of each assortment of individual indicators. Again, we follow Levine (2002) to define 
and construct them. Specifically each aggregate indicator is defined as the first linear 
combination of the three individual indicators that integrate each financial assortment. 
Thus the three aggregate indicators summarise the relevant information of the 
environment. These indicators are the Structure-Aggregate and Finance-Aggregate 
ones. Here it is important to point out that the eight financial indicators used here are 
the conventional ones used to assess the merits of different financial systems. 
 
We use first principal-components to capture what may be common to all the 
indicators that integrate an assortment of correlated variables. Given the lack of 
empirical definitions for financial development and financial structure, we use the 
aggregate indicators as indexes of scale for the level of financial development and for 
the relative prominence of markets in the financial system. We do not use an 
equivalent measure for banking competition because the interpretation of the 
aggregate index becomes unclear without further microeconomic assumptions.  
 
The set of banking and financial indicators is summarised in the following table: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Size equals the logarithm of the market capitalization ratio divided by the bank credit ratio. Structure-
Efficiency equals the logarithm of the total value traded ratio times overhead costs. These indicators try 
to assess the activity, size and efficiency of stock markets relative to that of banks. However, we must 
point out that Levine (2002) indicates that the third indicator has problems to be considered a good 
measure of financial structure. Here we include it for completeness and consistency purposes.  
9
 Levine (2002) uses these three indicators to assess the degree to which national financial systems 
provide financial services. Finance-Activity equals the logarithm of the total value traded ratio times 
the private credit ratio. Finance-Size equals the logarithm of the market capitalization ratio times the 
private credit ratio. Finance-Efficiency equals the logarithm of the total value traded ratio divided by 
overhead costs. Levine (2002) indicates that the second indicator has problems to be considered a good 
measure of financial development. Like in the case of the Structure-Efficiency indicator, we use it for 
completeness and consistency purposes. .  
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Table 2. Banking and Financial Indicators 
 
 
 
Name 
 
Definition 
 
Measurement  
 
Banking Fragility Indicators 
 
Crisis 
 
Binary variable for fragility: 
Banking crisis=1 
Non banking crisis=0 
Episodes of systemic and/or non 
systemic banking crises 
Banking Competition Indicators 
 
Banking Concentration 
 
 
( )BCONBNKCON ln=  
 
Banking system concentration 
 
Banking Domestic 
 
 
( )FBSABNKDOM −= 1ln  
 
Share of domestically-owned 
banks 
 
Banking Public 
 
 
( )PBSABNKPUB ln=  
 
Share of publicly-owned banks 
 
Banking Activity 
 
 





=
BLCY
DBPCY
BNKLACT ln
 
 
Activity of banks relative to that 
of bank-like institutions 
 
Banking Size 
 
 





=
BLAY
DBGDP
BNKSIZ ln  
 
Size of banks relative to that of 
bank-like institutions 
Financial Structure Indicators 
 
Structure Activity 
 





=
DBPCY
SMVY
STCACT ln  
Activity of stock markets 
relative to that of banks  
 
Structure Size 
 





=
DBPCY
SMCY
STCSIZ ln  
Size of stock markets relative to 
that of banks 
 
Structure Efficiency 
 
 
( )BOHCSMVYSTCEFF *ln=
 
Efficiency of stock markets 
relative to that of banks 
 
Structure Aggregate 
 
First principal component of the 
set of individual financial 
structure indicators. 
Scale index of financial 
structure.  
Financial Development Indicators 
 
Finance Activity 
 
 ( )TIPCYSMVY
FINACT
*ln
=
 
Activity of stock markets and 
intermediaries  
 
Finance Size 
 ( )TIPCYSMCY
FINSIZ
*ln
=
 
Size of stock markets and 
intermediaries 
 
Finance Efficiency 
 





=
BOHC
SMVY
FINEFF ln  
Financial sector efficiency  
 
Finance Aggregate 
 
First principal component of the 
set of individual financial 
development indicators. 
Scale index of financial 
development.   
Notes: Large values of the banking activity and size indicators are associated to banking institutions; 
small ones to bank-like ones. Large values of the financial structure indicators are associated to market-
based financial systems; small ones to bank-based ones. Large values of the financial development 
indicators relate to high levels of financial development.  
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4. Methodological issues on the assessment of the stylised facts 
OLS regressions allow us to determine certain empirical associations between the 
banking and financial indicators. Specifically they are used to analyse how the 
financial situation of banking systems may affect the associations between banking 
competition and financial structure and between banking competition and financial 
development. We denominate such associations as the stylised facts between banking 
competition and financial systems. The regressions will allow us to establish such 
stylised facts by comparing the outcomes of specific sets of OLS regressions. 
 
The stylised facts are assessed with four OLS regression sets. Each set study specific 
banking and financial relationships. The first set studies the relationships among the 
banking market structure and bank-like indicators. The second set studies the 
relationships of the banking indicators with respect to the financial development ones. 
The third set studies the relationships of the banking indicators with respect to the 
financial structure ones.  Here it is important to recall that our focus is merely on the 
empirical associations. Thus the regressions do not aim at clarifying any causality. 
 
Each regression set allows us to study specific relationships through the comparison 
of the outcomes of the subsets that integrate each set. Specifically each set is 
integrated by subsets of three single-variable regressions that describe the association 
between a specific pair of indicators for different data samples. In each subset, the 
first regression estimates an association using all the sampled data. The second and 
third regressions re-estimate the same association using two data sub-samples that are 
differentiated according to the fragility indicator.  
 
Comparisons among the regressions allow us to progressively define the stylised facts 
associated with the banking and financial indicators. Notice that the outcomes of each 
subset of regressions allow us to analyse how the financial situation of banking 
systems may affect the associations between specific pairs of indicators. These 
outcomes may show that certain associations can be consistent in spite of the financial 
situation that the banking system of a country may be experiencing. The existence of 
consistent associations in a subset of regressions allows us to define an empirical 
relationship. Consistent relationships allow us to define an empirical stylised fact.  
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5. Failure-determinant methodology and the assessment of fragility determinants 
Here we discuss how we assess the effects of banking competition determinants on 
banking fragility. In spite that our approach is developed along the lines of the 
failure–determinant literature, we believe important to emphasise that we use logit 
models for panel data. We emphasise this feature because traditional studies use a 
multivariate logit approach to analyse the determinants of banking crises.
10
 
Statistically our panel-data approach allows us to combine the properties of time-
series and cross-sectional data for estimation purposes. Furthermore, it allows us to 
take advantage of all the data available. 
 
Here we use logit models for panel data to assess the determinants of fragility. We 
assume logistic functions because logit models have statistical advantages with 
respect to probit ones in terms of estimator consistency and parsimony of assumptions 
[See Woolridge (2002)]. Furthermore, we focus on estimations with fixed-effects to 
get rid of time-constant unobserved heterogeinity among the countries analysed. 
Statistically, fixed-effects estimations are adequate as long as we can reject, for 
estimations with random-effects, the null hypothesis that the fraction of the total 
variance due to idiosyncratic errors is zero.
11
 
 
The traditional financial fragility literature includes indicator sets that capture the 
main characteristics of the environment [Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), 
(2000)]. Mathematically the matrix of independent K vector-
variables
itKititit xxxx ,...,, 21=  describes the environment through the inclusion of 
failure-determinant and control variables. In our study, the former variables include 
the banking indicators while the latter variables include the financial structure and 
development indicators.
12
 Thus, in our case the matrix is defined as:  
                                                           
10
 Classic studies that use the multivariate logit approach are Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
and (2000) and Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1999). 
11
 Such null hypothesis is expressed as Ho: ρ=0. The intuition underlying this hypothesis is that random 
effects are close to fixed effects when the estimated variance of unobserved effects,
2
cσ , is relatively 
large compared to the one of the idiosyncratic errors, 
2
uσ . Notice that 22
2
cu
u
σσ
σ
ρ
+
= . 
12
 We are particularly aware that some important control variables are omitted due to the absence of 
data. Relevant omissions include variables to describe different regulatory regimes like deposit 
insurance, minimum capital requirements and deposit rate ceilings. We completely agree with a referee 
who pointed out that regulatory regimes may have differentiated impacts on banking fragility. 
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[ ]itititit FSB ,,=x         (1) 
Where 
itM  Vector of banking indicators 
 
itS  Vector of financial structure indicators   
 itF  Vector of financial development indicators 
 
Panel-data techniques allow us to use the data available. We consider this feature 
important not only for estimation purposes, but also because of the potential 
generality of the estimation results. Such results may be obtained by consistent 
estimations of the coefficient vector [ ]FSB βββ ,,=β . Here we denominate the linear 
functional form of the logit models that relates  itx  and β as the banking-competition 
specification. Such linear functional form will be used for the empirical estimations of 
the failure-determinant models. Linearity is a traditional convention in the failure-
determinant literature. 
 
The analysis of how competition may affect the stability of banking systems depends 
on several estimations of the coefficient vectorβ .  We use these estimations to clarify 
the nature of the effects of the banking industry determinants. Like other failure-
determinant studies, a clear limitation of the analysis refers to the potential existence 
of endogeneity. This limitation is rarely, if ever, mentioned in failure-determinant 
studies. Endogeneity can arise due to the omission of relevant variables, due to 
measurement errors or because of simultaneity. We are aware of this potential 
statistical problem. We deal with it by using further empirical regressions and 
assuming that causality can be established under certain empirical premises. 
 
Endogenity is not only an econometric problem. Endogeneity and causality issues can 
arise under the basis that it is very difficult to disentangle the notion of banking 
fragility from the state of development and the structure of financial systems and the 
degree of banking competition.  Our study is based on the premise that the design of 
the financial system, the level of financial development and banking competition are 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Currently, the only public database on banking regulatory and supervision practices is the one of Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2001). Unfortunately the time span and country coverage of this database do not 
coincide with the ones of our study.   
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exogenous to the phenomenon of financial crises. However, we must recognise that 
this is a very restrictive premise for the assessment and interpretation of the 
econometric results.
13
  
 
Econometrically we deal with endogeinity issues based on further panel-data 
regressions and further empirical assumptions. We use random-effects logit 
regressions to deal with the issues of omitted variable bias and sample size associated 
to fixed-effects estimations.
14
 We use such regressions to analyse statistical 
consistency. We deal with the causality issue under the basis that each view on the 
relationship between competition and fragility predicts certain signs for the estimated 
coefficients. Specifically, the view that assumes that competition enhances fragility 
predicts that all the estimated coefficients will be negative. The opposite view predicts 
positive ones. Finally the third view predicts that they will be differentiated or non 
significant.
15
  
  
 
6. Econometric assessment of stylised facts 
Here we report the regression results associated to the assessment of the stylised facts 
between competition and financial systems. First we report the results used to 
investigate the relationships among the individual indicators. Specifically we report 
the results related to the relationships between banking competition and financial 
development and between banking competition and financial structure. Then we 
report the results associated to the set of aggregate indicators. Finally we summarise 
the results of the three regression sets. In all the regressions we have included a 
constant term to eliminate constant effects.  
                                                           
13
 Such restrictiveness can be understood in terms of the interpretation of the empirical results: Suppose 
that for a given set of results we establish that financial underdevelopment and the lack of banking 
competition causes financial fragility (in line with our main premise). However, it may be perfectly 
reasonable to think about banking fragility in terms of a manifestation of financial underdevelopment 
and, by extension, of banking inefficiency and the lack of banking competition. Under the later 
interpretation, we suggest the existence of simultaneity, but not of causality 
14 Wooldridge (2002: p. 252), indicates “This approach [with random effects] is certainly appropriate 
from an omitted variables or neglected heterogeneity perspective”. Moreover, because the number of 
countries is relatively large, fixed-effects models would lead us to losses in the number of degrees of 
freedom. 
15 Methodologically we are assuming that the competitive behaviour of banking systems depends on 
specific features of the local banking industry (low banking concentration, openness to foreign 
incumbents, profit maximisation driven by private banks and the existence of providers of substitute 
financial services).  We are aware that these assumptions are particularly strong for empirical purposes. 
However the available data do not allow us to address this issue more properly.  
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The first regression set analyses the associations between financial development and 
banking competition indicators. We summarise the econometric results in the 
following table: 
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  Table 3. Banking Competition and Financial Development 
(Regression Analysis) 
 
Regressor 
Indicator 
All Observations 
(1) 
Stable Banking Systems 
 (2) 
 Fragile Banking Systems 
 (3) 
 
 
 
β 
(t) 
 
R
2 
 
 
 
β 
(t) 
 
R
2 
 
 
 
β 
(t) 
 
R
2 
 
 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Concentration 
Finance 
Activity 
-0.03** 
(-4.85 ) 
0.10 -0.04*** 
(-3.98) 
0.07 -0.04*** 
(-3.25) 
0.07 
Finance 
Size 
-0.04*** 
(-3.54) 
0.04 -0.03** 
(-2.47) 
0.03 -0.06*** 
(-2.73) 
0.07 
Finance 
Efficiency 
-0.03*** 
(-3.57) 
0.04 -0.03*** 
(-2.76) 
0.03 -0.04*** 
(-2.74) 
0.07 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Domestic 
Finance 
Activity 
0.02*** 
(4.85) 
0.08 0.04*** 
(4.85) 
0.22 0.00 
(1.60) 
0.02 
Finance 
Size 
0.03*** 
(5.10) 
0.09 0.05*** 
(5.60) 
0.17 0.01* 
(1.85) 
0.03 
Finance 
Efficiency 
0.02*** 
(4.31) 
0.07 0.03*** 
(5.70) 
0.17 0.01 
(1.54) 
0.02 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Public 
Finance 
Activity 
0.05 
(0.69) 
0.01 -0.17 
(-0.95) 
0.05 0.38*** 
(4.70) 
0.51 
Finance 
Size 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
0.00 -0.20 
(-0.95) 
0.04 0.81*** 
(3.63) 
0.42 
Finance 
Efficiency 
0.10 
(1.09) 
0.03 -0.33 
(-1.48) 
0.10 0.46*** 
(6.48) 
0.70 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Activity 
Finance 
Activity 
-0.06* 
(-1.83) 
0.01 -0.03 
(-0.64) 
0.00 -0.09** 
(-2.10) 
0.07 
Finance 
Size 
-0.18*** 
(-3.17) 
0.05 -0.13* 
(-1.68) 
0.02 -0.22*** 
(-3.12) 
0.15 
Finance 
Efficiency 
-0.13*** 
(-3.17) 
0.06 -0.12* 
(-1.95) 
0.03 -0.15*** 
(-2.74) 
0.13 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Size 
Finance 
Activity 
-0.00 
(-0.20) 
0.00 0.01 
(0.24) 
0.00 -0.02 
(-0.46) 
0.00 
Finance 
Size 
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.00 0.04 
(0.55) 
0.00 -0.00 
(-0.02) 
0.00 
Finance 
Efficiency 
-0.06 
(-1.49) 
0.01 -0.08 
(-1.34) 
0.01 -0.05 
(-0.94) 
0.01 
Notes:  
The regressions use OLS to estimate equations of the form: y=α+βx, where y and x are the regressed 
and regressor indicators, respectively. The regressions use different observations for comparison 
purposes. Specifically, the first column refers to regressions that include all the observations. The 
second column refers to regressions that include observations for which the banking fragility variable is 
equal to zero. The third column refers to the ones for which the banking fragility variable is equal to 
one.  Each column contains the estimate of β, the t-statistic of this estimate (in parentheses) and the R2 
value of the regression. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. The estimated coefficients for constants are not reported. 
 18 
Table 3 shows differentiated relationships among the banking competition and 
financial development indicators according to fragility. Particularly it suggests that the 
degree of financial development is low in countries with concentrated banking 
systems. All the estimated regressions between the concentration and development 
indicators are negative and significant. Moreover the comparisons among data 
samples suggest that such relationship is magnified during episodes of banking crises. 
The coefficients β and R
2
 are relatively higher and more statistically significant for the 
sample involving episodes of banking fragility.  
 
An interesting finding is that financial development indicators are positively 
correlated to the share of domestic-owned banks. The regressions are statistically 
significant in most cases. Moreover, such relationship is magnified during stability 
periods. We are aware that this finding may be counter-intuitive on the basis that 
foreign banks may induce competition and incentives for innovation.  However this 
finding is consistent with the idea that domestic bankers may have better knowledge 
of the local market. Also, this finding is consistent in terms of the positive correlation 
between financial and banking development: In developed banking systems domestic 
banks may be more stable and less likely to be purchased by foreign banks. 
 
According the regressions, public banking might enhance financial development. 
Comparisons among the associations suggest that the relationships between financial 
development and public banking depend on the stability of banking systems. The 
evidence shows that financial development indicators are positively correlated to the 
share of public-owned banks only when the banking systems are experiencing crises. 
Otherwise, the estimations are neither consistent nor significant. This finding may 
reflect public efforts to deal with banking crises and to stabilise banking systems. 
 
Other findings suggest that the degree of financial development is low in countries 
with relatively active banking systems. Almost all the estimated regressions between 
the banking activity and financial development indicators are negative and significant. 
Moreover, like in the case of the concentration indicator, the comparisons among data 
samples suggest that such relationship is magnified during episodes of banking crises. 
The coefficients β and R
2
 are relatively higher and more statistically significant for the 
sample involving episodes of banking fragility.  
 19 
 
The second regression set analyses the relationships between financial structure and 
banking competition. We summarise the results of the regression set of individual 
indicators in the following table:   
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Table 4. Banking Competition and Financial Structure 
(Regression Analysis) 
 
Regressor 
Indicator 
All Observations 
(1) 
Stable Banking Systems 
(2) 
Fragile Banking Systems 
(3) 
 
 
 
β 
(t) 
 
R
2 
 
 
 
β 
(t) 
 
R
2 
 
 
 
β 
(t) 
 
R
2 
 
 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Concentration 
Structure 
Activity 
-0.05*** 
(-3.95) 
0.05 -0.08*** 
(-4.67) 
0.10 -0.03 
(-1.56) 
0.02 
Structure 
Size 
-0.00 
(-0.02) 
0.00 -0.04 
(-1.26) 
0.00 0.05 
(1.17) 
0.01 
Structure 
Efficiency 
-0.04*** 
(-3.98) 
0.05 -0.06*** 
(-4.43) 
0.09 -0.03* 
(-1.69) 
0.03 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Domestic 
Structure 
Activity 
0.03*** 
(4.11) 
0.06 0.07*** 
(6.46) 
0.21 0.01 
(1.22) 
0.01 
Structure 
Size 
0.04*** 
(2.70) 
0.03 0.07*** 
(3.00) 
0.05 0.01 
(0.84) 
0.00 
Structure 
Efficiency 
0.02*** 
(3.91) 
0.06 0.04*** 
(5.44) 
0.16 0.01 
(1.44) 
0.02 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Public 
Structure 
Activity 
0.16 
(1.54) 
0.05 -0.75* 
(-1.75) 
0.15 0.44*** 
(6.35) 
0.65 
Structure 
Size 
0.33 
(1.26) 
0.03 -2.84*** 
(-3.68) 
0.42 0.97*** 
(6.01) 
0.66 
Structure 
Efficiency 
0.08 
(0.88) 
0.01 -0.28 
(-1.24) 
0.07 0.35*** 
(3.93) 
0.46 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Activity 
Structure 
Activity 
-0.06 
(-1.08) 
0.00 -0.03 
(-0.42) 
0.00 -0.07 
(-0.87) 
0.01 
Structure 
Size 
-0.35*** 
(-2.65) 
0.03 -0.40** 
(-2.28) 
0.04 -0.19 
(-0.98) 
0.01 
Structure 
Efficiency 
-0.07 
(-1.15) 
0.00 -0.01 
(-0.12) 
0.00 -0.12 
(-1.54) 
0.04 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Size 
Structure 
Activity 
-0.04 
(-0.84) 
0.00 -0.09 
(-1.20) 
0.01 0.02 
(0.34) 
0.00 
Structure 
Size 
-0.10 
(-0.84) 
0.00 -0.56*** 
(-3.17) 
0.07 0.37** 
(2.30) 
0.07 
Structure 
Efficiency 
0.01 
(0.34) 
0.00 0.01 
(0.18) 
0.00 0.01 
(0.23) 
0.00 
Notes:  
The regressions use OLS to estimate equations of the form: y=α+βx, where y and x are the regressed 
and regressor indicators, respectively. The regressions use different observations for comparison 
purposes. Specifically, the first column refers to regressions that include all the observations. The 
second column refers to regressions that include observations for which the banking fragility variable is 
equal to zero. The third column refers to the ones for which the banking fragility variable is equal to 
one.  Each column contains the estimate of β, the t-statistic of this estimate (in parentheses) and the R2 
value of the regression. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. The estimated coefficients for constants are not reported. 
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Table 4 also shows differentiated relationships among the banking competition and 
financial structure indicators according to banking fragility. Particularly it suggests 
that concentrated banking systems prevail in bank-based financial systems. Financial 
structure indicators are negatively correlated to the ratio of the three largest banks to 
total banking assets. In spite that this main finding per se is not surprising, the 
comparisons among samples suggest that such relationship is magnified during 
banking stability periods. β and R
2
, are relatively high and statistically significant for 
the sample involving episodes of banking stability. 
 
An unexpected finding is that financial structure indicators are positively correlated to 
the share of domestic-owned banks. The estimated regressions are positive and 
statistically significant in most cases. Moreover, the comparisons among samples 
suggest that such association is magnified during banking stability periods. Such 
findings may suggest that a high degree of foreign penetration prevails in bank-based 
financial systems. However our findings also show that the property regime of banks 
does not matter when the banking systems are unstable. 
 
The regressions show differentiated associations between the public banking indicator 
with respect to financial development. Such differentiation depends on the financial 
situation of the banking system. Specifically our findings suggest that private banks 
prevail in bank-based financial systems during banking fragility periods. But they 
also suggest that public banks prevail in bank-based systems during stable ones. In 
both cases the regression coefficients are mostly significant. However, according to β 
and R
2
, it is likely that the former association might prevail as a relationship.      
 
Not surprisingly, our findings show that the relative prominence of banks with respect 
to bank-like institutions characterises bank-based financial systems. In most 
regressions, the financial structure indicators are negatively correlated to the banking 
activity and banking size ones. Moreover, such relationships are magnified during 
banking crises. Interestingly the regressions show that the size of banks increases in 
bank-based financial systems during fragility periods. But they also suggest that the 
size of banks increases in market-based financial systems during stability periods.  
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The third regression set analyses the relationships between the banking and financial 
aggregate indexes. We summarise the results of the regression set of indicators in the 
following table:   
 
 
Table 5. Banking and Financial Aggregate Indicators 
(Regression Analysis) 
 
Regressor 
Indicator 
All Observations 
(1) 
Stable Banking Systems 
(2) 
Fragile Banking Systems 
(3) 
 β 
(t) 
R
2 
 β 
(t) 
R
2  
 
 
β 
(t) 
R
2 
 
 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Concentration 
Finance 
Aggregate 
-0.05*** 
(-3.85) 
0.05 -0.05*** 
(-2.85) 
0.04 -0.07*** 
(-2.93) 
0.09 
Structure 
Aggregate 
-.04*** 
(-2.61) 
0.02 -.07*** 
(-3.51) 
0.06 -.02 
(-0.81) 
0.00 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Domestic 
Finance 
Aggregate 
0.03*** 
(4.96) 
0.09 0.05*** 
(5.98) 
0.20 0.02* 
(1.91) 
0.04 
Structure 
Aggregate 
0.02*** 
(3.87) 
0.06 0.05*** 
(5.40) 
0.17 0.01 
(1.38) 
0.02 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Public 
Finance 
Aggregate 
0.12 
(0.72) 
0.01 -0.33 
(-1.08) 
0.06 0.80*** 
(5.24) 
0.66 
Structure 
Aggregate 
0.15 
(1.24) 
0.04 -0.77* 
(-1.94) 
0.18 0.45*** 
(4.80) 
0.62 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Activity 
Finance 
Aggregate 
-0.23*** 
(-3.54) 
0.07 -0.21** 
(-2.14) 
0.04 -0.25*** 
(-3.19) 
0.17 
Structure 
Aggregate 
-0.21** 
(-2.50) 
0.03 -0.22 
(-1.60) 
0.02 -0.20* 
(-1.93) 
0.07 
 
Regressed Indicator: Banking-Size 
Finance 
Aggregate 
-0.06 
(-0.94) 
0.00 -0.08 
(-0.81) 
0.00 -0.06 
(-0.71) 
0.00 
Structure 
Aggregate 
-0.04 
(-0.61) 
0.00 -0.28** 
(-1.99) 
0.03 0.07 
(0.71) 
0.00 
Notes:  
The regressions use OLS to estimate equations of the form: y=α+βx, where y and x are the regressed 
and regressor indicators, respectively. The regressions use different observations for comparison 
purposes. Specifically, the first column refers to regressions that include all the observations. The 
second column refers to regressions that include observations for which the banking fragility variable is 
equal to zero. The third column refers to the ones for which the banking fragility variable is equal to 
one.  Each column contains the estimate of β, the t-statistic of this estimate (in parentheses) and the R2 
value of the regression. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent 
respectively. The estimated coefficients for constants are not reported. 
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Table 5 shows that the aggregate financial indicators are negatively correlated to the 
banking indicators of concentration, activity and size and positively with the domestic 
one. These findings suggest that banking concentration, the relative prominence of 
banks and foreign ownership are associated to bank-based financial systems and 
financial underdevelopment. As before, the consistency and robustness of these 
associations depends on banking fragility. Furthermore the regressions suggest that 
public banking is associated to market-based financial systems and financial 
development during banking crises. 
 
We summarise by indicating that the financial situation prevailing in the banking 
systems (the stability or fragility one), emphasises specific associations between 
financial development and the banking competition determinants. Concretely banking 
crises emphasise the negative correlations between financial development with 
banking concentration and the relative prominence of banking over bank-like 
institutions. They also emphasise the positive correlations between financial 
development and public banking. Stability periods emphasise the positive correlation 
between financial development and domestically owned banks.  
 
The financial situation also emphasises specific associations between financial 
structure and banking competition. Our findings show that banking crises emphasise 
the associations between bank-based financial systems with the relative activity of 
banking institutions, and the ones between market-based financial systems with public 
banking.  Furthermore they also show that banking stability periods emphasise the 
associations between bank-based financial systems with banking concentration, public 
banking and the relative size of banking institutions, and the ones between market-
based financial systems with domestically owned banks.    
 
We conclude by pointing out that the evidence suggests differentiated associations 
among the banking and financial indicators. Specifically the stylised facts suggest that 
banking concentration, foreign ownership and the relative activity and size of banks 
with respect to those of bank-like institutions are associated to bank-based financial 
systems and financial underdevelopment. They also suggest that domestically and 
publicly owned banks may prevail in market-based and financially developed 
financial systems, at least, during banking crisis episodes.  
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7. Econometric assessment of the effects of the banking determinants 
Here we report the outcomes of the two sets of failure-determinant models that 
estimate the banking-competition specification defined by equation (1). These 
outcomes complement the previous OLS regressions. Furthermore the outcomes will 
allow us to compare the evidence with the alternative theoretical predictions regarding 
the effects of banking competition on banking fragility. But also they will allow us to 
analyse the specific and joint effects of banking competition determinants on fragility. 
In all the estimations we have included the aggregate financial indicators as control 
variables. 
 
The first set of failure determinants models focuses on the specific effects of the 
banking determinants on banking fragility. We summarise the results of this set of 
failure-determinant models in the following table:   
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Table 6 shows differentiated effects of the specific banking competition determinants 
on financial fragility. Particularly the analysis shows that concentration enhances the 
stability of banking systems and that banking credit activity enhances their fragility. 
However, none of the determinants are statistically significant. Furthermore the 
evidence suggests that financial underdevelopment and the orientation toward 
marked-based financial systems might enhance banking stability. In fact all the 
coefficient estimations of the significant financial structure indicators are negative. 
Thus the estimations support the idea that financial structure matters to assess 
banking performance. 
 
Further results offer weak evidence that the higher the share of public and 
domestically owned banks or the higher size of the banking sector with respect to that 
of like-bank institutions, the higher probability that banking crises will occur. Thus, 
the regressions might suggest that the performance of the banking system may depend 
on the property regime of banks.  This conclusion has support on other banking 
studies.
16
 However the evidence is not conclusive because only the domestic 
ownership coefficient is significant.  Moreover, it could be argued that the public 
banking coefficient may appear as a consequence of government efforts to deal with 
banking crises. 
 
 
What effects may have the joint of banking competition determinants on financial 
fragility? We explore this question with a set of panel-data regressions that include 
multiple banking determinants. We follow the Sargan-and-Hendry approach to build 
it.
 17
 Econometrically such approach allows us to dismiss the possibility of 
specification and model selection problems. Hence we show the outcomes of a 
general regression model that includes all the fragility determinants and the outcomes 
of simplified models of it. Then we use log likelihood and z-statistics tests in order to 
simplify the model and to choose among several alternative regression specifications. 
 
The second set includes fixed-effects panel-data regressions that focus on the joint 
effects of banking determinants on fragility according to the guidelines indicated 
                                                           
16
 See Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005).  
17
 About this approach it has been indicated that “[Sargan and Hendry] argue in favor of starting with a 
very general model and simplifying it progressively based on the data available” [Maddala (1992:3)].  
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above. We summarise the results of this set of failure-determinant models in the 
following table:   
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Table 7 confirms that banking competition determinants have differentiated effects on 
financial fragility. The regressions confirm that the relative credit activity of banks 
significantly enhances the fragility of banking systems. They also confirm that 
financial development enhances it. In most models the estimated determinants are 
consistent. Furthermore the evidence confirms that the orientation toward marked-
based financial systems might enhance stability. In fact all the coefficient estimations, 
of the significant financial structure indicators, are negative. Thus the estimations also 
confirm that financial structure matters to assess banking performance. 
 
The second regression set offers additional information on the relationship between 
banking competition and financial fragility. According to statistical tests, the best 
parsimonious specification that describes such relationship corresponds to the fourth 
simplified model. Such specification includes indicators of financial structure, 
domestic ownership and relative activity of banks as explanatory variables.
18
 
Interestingly, other results in the regression set seem to contradict our previous 
findings regarding the effects of banking concentration and domestic ownership. 
However none of the estimated coefficients are significant.   
 
What effect does banking competition may have on financial fragility? According to 
the both regression sets, it is likely that banking determinants have differentiated 
effects. Specifically, if credit activity relies on banking institutions or the orientation 
of the financial system is bank-based, the outcomes suggest that banking fragility will 
be enhanced. Furthermore, both regression sets offer weak evidence that financial 
development and, particularly, the property regime matters. Indeed the Banking-
Domestic indicator seems necessary to avoid misspecification problems. However 
none of the indicators are statistically significant.   
 
We support our results with statistical tests and further regressions. Specifically, the 
overall significance of the variables used in the models is supported with likelihood 
ratio tests. According to the Wald criterion, all the models in both regression sets are 
                                                           
18
 We arrive to such conclusion by using the log likelihood indicators in the fourth and fifth simplified 
models. According to an omitted variables-ratio test, the inclusion of the Banking Domestic indicator is 
relevant for specification testing purposes. With a level of significance of 0.01 63.621 =χ , the null 
hypothesis of no incorrect omission is rejected [LR=-2(-21.52+15.04) =12.96]. 
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significant [See Tables 6 and 7]. We assess the consistency and adequacy of the 
models with further random-effects logit regressions [See the Appendix]. By such 
regressions we conclude that the results obtained with the models are consistent and 
that fixed-effects are necessary for estimation purposes. Moreover, they also confirm 
that the Banking-Domestic indicator is necessary for specification purposes.  
 
We summarise by indicating that the evidence shows differentiated effects of the 
banking determinants on fragility. Specifically the outcomes suggest that if credit 
activity relies on banks or if the financial system is bank-based, the likelihood of 
crises will increase. Another suggestion is that the banking determinants, the features 
of the financial system and the property regime of banks jointly matter to analyse the 
likelihood of crises. Empirically the results support the view that the relationship 
between banking competition and financial fragility involves more than a trade-off. 
Moreover they support the idea that financial structure matters to assess fragility. 
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8. Conclusions and discussion 
The issue of how banking competition affects the stability of banking systems is not 
well understood. Here we have shown the results of an investigation regarding the 
clarification of such issue by using a panel-data for 47 countries during the period 
1990-97. Such investigation has relied on an extension of the failure-determinant 
methodology that uses a double-technique approach based on OLS regressions and 
fixed-effects logit models for panel-data. We have aimed at clarifying the stylised 
facts associated with the banking and financial indicators and at assessing the specific 
and joint effects of banking competition determinants on financial fragility.  
 
The evidence suggests differentiated associations among the banking and financial 
indicators. Specifically the stylised facts suggest that banking concentration, foreign 
ownership and the relative activity and size of banks with respect to those of bank-like 
institutions are associated to bank-based financial systems and financial 
underdevelopment. They also suggest that domestically and publicly owned banks 
may prevail in market-based and financially developed financial systems, at least, 
during banking crisis episodes. Apparently the financial situation of banking systems 
matters to assess the associations among the indicators. 
 
The models for panel-data show differentiated effects of the banking determinants on 
fragility. Specifically the outcomes suggest that if credit activity relies on banks or if 
the financial system is bank-based, the likelihood of crises will increase. Another 
suggestion is that the banking determinants, the features of the financial system and 
the property regime of banks jointly matter to analyse the likelihood of crises. 
Empirically the results support the view that the relationship between banking 
competition and financial fragility involves more than a trade-off. Moreover they 
support the idea that financial structure matters to assess fragility. 
 
The study leads to some interesting implications and suggestions for further research 
and policy-making: The first one relates to the property regime of banks. Our findings 
suggest that it is likely that the property regime matters to explain financial fragility in 
spite of the lack of statistical significance of the ownership indicators. Assuming that 
public, private, domestic and foreign banks have different goals and experience, it is 
very likely that their behaviour may be different under the same economic and 
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financial conditions. Such considerations make us believe that further studies on the 
performance of banks and their fragility should focus on the property regime.  
 
Academically we believe that one of the most surprising conclusions of our study 
refers to banking concentration. Our panel-data models suggest that concentration is 
not a significant determinant of fragility. We are aware that this finding contradicts 
other studies and even our own intuition.
19
 Many studies use this indicator as the 
measure of competition. Moreover, policy-makers usually consider concentration as 
an important issue whenever they discuss competitive and stability issues.  Apparently 
the inclusion of fixed-effects in our models reduces the significance of the 
concentration indicator. Thus our results might suggest that the effects supposedly 
caused by banking concentration, really depend on time-constant country features.  
 
We believe that our study suggests some ideas relevant for the policy-making process. 
The first one is that there are not general policy-making strategies to deal with 
financial stability issues. Our results suggest that such strategies should be “tailored” 
according to the specific features of the banking and financial sectors of the economy. 
Furthermore, an important consideration pointed out by the ones that support the view 
that banking competition involves more than a simple trade-off, is that perfect 
financial stability can be socially undesirable [See Allen and Gale (2004a)].   Thus 
regulations should not always need to avoid the occurrence of banking crises. 
 
A final implication of our analysis is that financial structure matters to assess banking 
performance. The interactions among intermediaries and financial markets seem to 
explain the likelihood banking crises.
20
 Indeed, we believe that further research may 
be developed along the guidelines of the literature of comparative financial systems 
[See Allen and Gale (2000) and (2004b)]. Published studies describe some empirical 
relationships between financial structure and crises [See Allen (2001) and Ruiz Porras 
(2006)]. However they do not study how financial and banking competition may 
affect the stability of banks. Our current efforts are oriented along this direction. 
 
                                                           
19
 Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003), among others, have considered banking concentration as 
an important determinant of banking stability.  
20
 We are aware that this argument is controversial. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001), arrive 
exactly to the opposite conclusion through the analysis of the determinants of banking profitability. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Here we show the estimation outcomes of the random-effects logit regressions for 
panel-data used to assess the consistency for the models in the main text. Furthermore, 
we use them to analyse the adequacy of fixed-effects for modelling purposes. We 
develop such assessments by reporting the outcomes of two sets of failure-
determinant regressions. Like in the main text, the first set includes regressions to 
study the effects of the specific banking determinants of banking crises. The second 
set includes regressions to study the joint effects of multiple banking determinants 
according to the Sargan-Hendry approach.    
 
The first set of failure-determinant regressions focuses on the specific effects of 
banking determinants on banking fragility. We summarise the results of this set of 
failure-determinant regressions in the following table:   
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Table A1 shows consistent results with the ones of the main text (Table 6). 
Specifically, the random-effects logit regressions confirm that banking credit activity, 
publicly and domestically-owned banks might enhance the fragility of banking 
systems. Moreover, they also confirm that the orientation toward marked-based 
financial systems enhances their stability. Furthermore most of the random-effects 
regressions reject the null hypothesis that the fraction of the total variance due to 
idiosyncratic errors is zero. Such rejection shows that the estimations with fixed-
effects, like the ones in the main text, are necessary for modelling purposes. 
 
The second set includes random-effects logit panel-data regressions that focus on the 
joint effects of banking determinants. We summarise the results of this second 
regression set in the following table: 
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Table A2 also shows consistent results with the ones of the main text (Table 7). The 
random-effects logit regressions confirm that banking concentration and financial 
development might enhance banking fragility. They also confirm that the credit 
activity of bank-like institutions and market-based financial systems may enhance 
banking stability. All the random-effects simplified regressions show that the 
estimations with fixed-effects are necessary for modelling purposes. Moreover, 
according to an omitted variables-ratio test again, in this regression set, the Banking-
Domestic indicator allows us to avoid misspecification problems.
21
 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
21
 We arrive to such conclusion by using the log likelihood indicators of the second and third simplified 
regressions. Again with a level of significance of 0.01 63.621 =χ , the null hypothesis of no incorrect 
omission is rejected [LR=-2(-55.59+45.95) =19.28]. 
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